Luczystrap / Releases / Status / Source & tags

Public provenance audit · checked 03 Aug 2026

Seven 1.4-family tags resolve to one commit. The four released EXEs do not.

Tags 1.4 through 1.4.9 share the public commit 778690b, yet their official assets have different byte sizes and SHA-256 digests. That breaks the public source-to-binary chain: the tag identifies a Git object, but it cannot explain which source produced each executable.

Direct answer: Luczystrap 1.4.9 cannot be independently rebuilt from its public tag as checked. This is a reproducibility and provenance limitation—not proof that the executable is malicious.
refs/tags/* Convergence map
1.4 1.4.1 1.4.5 1.4.6Beta 1.4.9 1.4.9.9 1.4Beta
Direct commit object 778690b “Modding Tools” · 28 Oct 2025 15:07 UTC
does not explain
1.4 EXE SHA 00c7…801d SHA 00c7…801d
1.4.1 EXE SHA a6eb…abb9 SHA a6eb…abb9
1.4.5 EXE SHA f80c…f773 SHA f80c…f773
1.4.9 EXE SHA d71c…2424 SHA d71c…2424
Git compare 1.4…1.4.9 Identical · 0 commits
Original visualization generated from the official tag refs, compare endpoint and release asset metadata.

01 / Measurable public state

The mismatch is small enough to count exactly.

Every number below comes from the public repository state and official release records on the check date.

Public tag refs 12

All tag references returned by GitHub.

API: matching-refs/tags
Shared commit 7

1.4-family refs resolving to 778690b.

Object type: commit
Different EXEs 4

Released 1.4-family assets with unique sizes and digests.

Same filename, different bytes
Git difference 0

Commits between tag 1.4 and tag 1.4.9.

Compare status: identical

02 / Release tag explorer

One commit reference. Four distinct release assets.

Select a shipped version to compare the same public Git object with the exact executable distributed on its release page.

Published release

First 1.4-family release Tag → asset check

Luczystrap 1.4

The 1.4 tag resolves to 778690b. Its official release asset is the smallest of the four published 1.4-family executables.

Tag object 778690b35adc1b9c296ed59570aa30f16ab673d5
Asset identity SHA-256 published
Release asset SHA-256 00c7badffbd60ae2724071c41b7413994f1a30ebae7ac3c2f8a08e41c97a801d
Open the official 1.4 release →

03 / Complete public tag map

The convergence begins only with the 1.4 family.

Earlier release tags resolve to distinct commits. The seven-reference cluster starts at 1.4 and includes three refs without a GitHub Release entry.

Tag ref Resolved object Relationship GitHub Release
1.0 c9c7993 Distinct commit Published
1.1 4f5280d Distinct commit Published
1.2 2e158a4 Distinct commit Published
1.3 11d116c Distinct commit Published
1.3.1 a0c59a3 Distinct commit Published
1.4 778690b Shared 1.4-family object Published
1.4.1 778690b Shared 1.4-family object Published
1.4.5 778690b Shared 1.4-family object Published
1.4.6Beta 778690b Shared 1.4-family object No entry
1.4.9 778690b Shared 1.4-family object Published
1.4.9.9 778690b Shared 1.4-family object No entry
1.4Beta 778690b Shared 1.4-family object No entry

Method: GitHub’s tag-ref API returns each object as type commit, meaning these refs point directly to commits rather than annotated tag objects. “No entry” means no matching item exists in the nine-entry official Releases ledger; it does not mean the ref is invalid.

04 / Exact binary ledger

The release files differ even when the public commit does not.

Different digests prove the assets are not byte-for-byte identical. They do not reveal which private source change, dependency, build setting or post-build step created the difference.

1.4 778690b
Published
28 Oct 2025 · 18:52 UTC
Identity
SHA-256 below
SHA-256
00c7badf…97a801d
Official release →
1.4.1 778690b
Published
28 Oct 2025 · 20:58 UTC
Identity
SHA-256 below
SHA-256
a6ebd89b…35316abb9
Official release →
1.4.5 778690b
Published
02 Nov 2025 · 11:12 UTC
Identity
SHA-256 below
SHA-256
f80cbe26…ba00f773
Official release →
1.4.9 778690b
Published
05 Nov 2025 · 20:40 UTC
Identity
SHA-256 below
SHA-256
d71c3105…cc352424
Official release →
Public input One commit
778690b
Published outputs Four unique
SHA-256 digests
Result No public one-to-one source provenance

05 / Reproducibility test

A tag is the first link—not the complete build chain.

A reproducible release needs every link below. One successful tag lookup cannot substitute for missing source, inputs, build instructions and output comparison.

01

Immutable version reference

The ref 1.4.9 resolves to a named commit.

Present
02

Complete application source

The current application directory contains only a source-closure marker.

Missing
03

Resolvable build graph

The solution references application and WPF UI project paths absent from the tree.

Unresolved
04

Pinned build recipe

No version-matched deterministic environment and dependency recipe is published.

Not published
05

Matching output

No independent build is shown matching the official 1.4.9 digest.

Not demonstrated

Evidence boundary: this audit can prove that the public reproduction chain is incomplete. It cannot infer what private source was used, whether a tag was intentionally reused, or whether the resulting binary is safe or unsafe.

06 / Claim boundary

Separate what the records prove from what they cannot answer.

This distinction prevents a technical provenance gap from turning into either a false open-source promise or an unsupported malware accusation.

Supported statements

What we can say

  • Seven 1.4-family refs resolve to commit 778690b.
  • Compare from 1.4 to 1.4.9 is identical with zero commits.
  • Four official 1.4-family assets have different sizes and digests.
  • The current public tree lacks the current application source.
  • Version 1.4.9 is not publicly reproducible as checked.
Unsupported conclusions

What we cannot say

  • Which private changes produced each released executable.
  • Why the project owner chose the shared tag target.
  • That 778690b is the actual source snapshot for 1.4.9.
  • That a matching rebuild exists but was simply not documented.
  • That non-reproducibility alone proves malicious behavior.

07 / How to close the gap

A future release can make every link independently testable.

These are concrete publication requirements, not a request for additional marketing language.

Publish version-matched source

Include every application project and submodule state needed to build the shipped version.

Creates the auditable input

Create a release-specific tag

Point a new immutable tag at the exact source snapshot used for the asset and retain its object identity.

Restores one version → one source

Pin toolchain and dependencies

Record the exact .NET SDK, dependency versions, submodules and build environment.

Controls hidden inputs

Document one clean build command

Provide an empty-environment procedure that resolves all projects and produces the release artifact.

Makes the process repeatable

Publish provenance with the asset

Attach the source commit, workflow run, build recipe and digest to the release.

Connects input to output

Verify an independent rebuild

Have a second environment reproduce the executable and publish whether its SHA-256 matches.

Completes the evidence chain

09 / FAQ

Questions about Luczystrap source and tags.

Can I build Luczystrap 1.4.9 from its public tag?

No reproducible public path is available. The tag resolves to 778690b, but the current tree lacks the current application source and a build graph capable of producing the official EXE.

How many Luczystrap tags point to commit 778690b?

Seven: 1.4, 1.4.1, 1.4.5, 1.4.6Beta, 1.4.9, 1.4.9.9 and 1.4Beta.

Are Luczystrap 1.4, 1.4.1, 1.4.5 and 1.4.9 the same executable?

No. Their SHA-256 digests differ. The shared public commit therefore cannot distinguish the source state that produced each asset.

What does the Luczystrap 1.4.9 tag prove?

It proves that the public Git ref named 1.4.9 resolves to commit 778690b. It does not prove that the official executable was built from that public tree.

Why do several Luczystrap tags point to the same commit?

The public records do not explain why. We can report the shared object and zero-commit comparison, but we cannot infer the owner’s reason.

Does a SHA-256 digest make Luczystrap reproducible?

No. It identifies the output bytes. Reproducibility also needs matching source, pinned inputs, a documented deterministic build and an independently matching result.

Does the source gap prove that Luczystrap is malicious?

No. It limits public provenance and independent verification. It is not evidence of malicious behavior by itself.

What would make a future Luczystrap release reproducible?

Complete version-matched source, an immutable release tag, pinned toolchain and dependencies, a clean build command, CI provenance, an official digest and an independently matching rebuild.